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LET’S TRY THIS AGAIN: THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008
ATTEMPTS TO REINVIGORATE THE “REGARDED AS” PRONG
OF THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
Stephen F. Befort*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 was enacted in 1990 with
considerable fanfare and support. A broad-based coalition of supporters testified in
favor of the legislation before committee hearings,2 and both houses of Congress
passed the legislation by wide margins.3 President George Bush, signing the ADA
into law, described the new statute as “an historic opportunity” representing “the
full flowering of our democratic principles.”4 Disability rights activists were
optimistic5 that the new legislation would accomplish its stated purpose of
providing a “national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”6
An important component of the ADA’s antidiscrimination formula is its
definition of disability. The ADA furthers the elimination of disability
discrimination by extending coverage not only to those individuals who currently
have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,7 but also to those
individuals who are “regarded as having such an impairment.”8 By this extension,
Congress affirmatively sought to curb “society’s accumulated myths and fears
about disability.”9
Reality, however, fell short of expectations. In several decisions beginning in
1999, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the class of protected “disabled”
*
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1
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
2
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. II, at 25–28 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 306–10.
3
The House of Representatives passed the ADA with a vote of 403–20. See
136 CONG. REC. 11,466–67 (1990). The Senate voted to approve the ADA with a margin of
76-8. See 135 CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989).
4
Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1070, 1070 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602.
5
See generally Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 19 (2000) (noting that the ADA was “enacted
amid hopes that it would have a sweeping impact”).
6
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
7
Id. § 12102(2)(A).
8
Id. § 12102(2)(C).
9
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
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employees. The most significant of these decisions was Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.10 in which the Court ruled that mitigating measures, such as medication and
prosthetic devices, should be taken into account in determining whether a person is
disabled for purposes of the ADA.11 The Court also ruled that a plaintiff is not
protected by virtue of being regarded as disabled unless the employer perceives the
plaintiff’s impairment as one that would substantially limit a major life activity.12
These excessively narrow rulings significantly raised the bar for ADA plaintiffs
and posed a serious obstacle to eliminating disability discrimination.
Following extensive negotiations between representatives of the disability and
business communities,13 Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA).14 The ADAAA explicitly overrules four Supreme Court decisions that
had narrowly interpreted the ADA’s definition of disability,15 and emphasizes that
the definition should be broadly construed.16 Although the ADA’s basic definition
of disability remains intact, the ADAAA clarifies in several ways that the statutory
definition should be interpreted in a more encompassing fashion.17
An individual may be covered by the ADA under any of the three prongs that
comprise the statutory definition of an individual with a disability: prong one,
which encompasses individuals who currently have an impairment that
substantially limits a major life function; prong two, which encompasses
individuals who have a record of such an impairment; or prong three, which
encompasses individuals who are regarded as having such an impairment.18 One of
the most significant changes made by the ADAAA is to the third, or “regarded as,”
prong of the definition of disability. In a sweeping overruling of the Sutton
decision, the ADAAA protects an individual from adverse action taken by an
employer “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.”19 As a compromise, however, Congress inserted two important statutory
limitations. The first limitation is that the “regarded as” prong does “not apply to
impairments that are transitory and minor.”20 The second limitation is that an

10

527 U.S. 471 (1999).
Id. at 482.
12
Id. at 489.
13
See Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 228–40 (2008) (describing the negotiations and
procedural steps culminating in the enactment of the ADAAA).
14
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(to be codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
15
Id. sec. 2(b)(2)–(5) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note).
16
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)).
17
See infra Part V.
18
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
19
ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)).
20
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)).
11
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employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation “to an individual who
meets the definition of disability . . . solely under [the ‘regarded as’ prong].”21
This Article focuses on the likely consequences of the “regarded as”
compromise embodied in the ADAAA. One positive consequence is clear: the
ADAAA’s elimination of any functional limitation requirement with respect to the
“regarded as” prong—that is, the elimination of any need to show that an
impairment, as perceived, substantially limits a major life activity—will greatly
expand the class of those with standing to assert a claim of disability
discrimination. On the other hand, the two accompanying limitations raise several
areas of uncertainty that will warrant close scrutiny. In particular, these two
limitations may provide a loophole by which the judiciary again may subvert the
intended reach of the ADA.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II discusses the origins and intended
scope of the ADA’s initial definition of disability with particular reference to the
reach of the “regarded as” prong. Part III then examines the judicial backlash that
resulted in the severe narrowing of the class of employees with a qualifying
disability under the ADA. Part IV describes the scholarly and legislative efforts to
override the limiting Supreme Court decisions. Part V summarizes the ADAAA
override generally and the “regarded as” provisions more specifically. Finally, part
VI takes a forward look at the likely impact and lingering concerns implicated by
the “regarded as” compromise.
II. THE ADA’S DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
The antidiscrimination formula adopted by Congress in the ADA is more
complicated than that employed by either Title VII or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). Both of these older federal statutes use a relatively
simple formula for banning discrimination. Title VII, for example, makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22 Although matters of
proof may be complicated under these two statutes, the legal principle is clear and
straightforward: discrimination because of a listed trait is unlawful.
The ADA’s ban on disability-based discrimination is considerably more
complicated. Paraphrasing three different portions of the statute, the ADA’s
original antidiscrimination formula can be stated as follows:
No employer shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual when the
individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
21

Id. sec. 6(a)(1), §501(h) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The ADEA uses similar language
in banning discrimination because of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be
unlawful for an employer . . . to . . . discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual’s age.”).
22
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essential functions of the employment position, unless the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of that employer. 23
Accordingly, the ADA’s antidiscrimination formula is more complicated in two
significant respects. First, only individuals who have a qualifying disability have
standing to assert a claim under the ADA.24 Second, in ascertaining whether an
employer is discriminating in violation of the ADA, the statute asks whether the
employee is qualified for the job “with or without reasonable accommodation,”25
unless such accommodation would impose an “undue hardship.”26 The more
complicated ADA formula has engendered uncertainty and a greater degree of
judicial interpretation,27 including six Supreme Court decisions construing the
ADA’s definition of disability.28
In defining a covered disability, the ADA borrowed the Rehabilitation Act’s
three-prong definition of a “handicapped individual.”29 Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, as originally enacted in 1973, prohibited discrimination against
an “otherwise qualified handicapped individual” in federally funded activities and
programs.30 A “handicapped individual” was defined as someone who “has a
23

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A).
See id. § 12112(a).
25
Id. Neither Title VII nor the ADEA generally impose any affirmative obligation on
employers to assist employees in satisfactorily performing the essential functions of their
jobs. These statutes, instead, merely invoke a negative prohibition against discrimination.
See Diller, supra note 5, at 40–44 (contrasting how the ADA employs a different-treatment
model of discrimination with how most antidiscrimination statutes employ an equaltreatment model of discrimination). While Title VII does impose a duty on an employer to
accommodate the religious observances and practices of its employees, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j), the Supreme Court has construed this duty as far more limited than that
imposed by the ADA, see TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (ruling that an
employer need not incur more than a de minimis hardship in providing an accommodation
for religious purposes).
26
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The term “undue hardship” is defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10)(A) as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.”
27
See Stephen F. Befort, The Story of Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.: Narrowing the
Reach of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES
329, 332–35 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
28
See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193–96 (2002);
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 536–37 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–25 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
478–88 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 801–05 (1999);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630–42 (1998).
29
See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006));
see also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 (explaining that “[t]he ADA’s definition of disability is
drawn almost verbatim” from the Rehabilitation Act).
30
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)).
24
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physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a
substantial handicap to employment.”31 One year later, Congress expanded the
definition of a “handicapped individual” to include any person who “(A) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person’s major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is
regarded as having such an impairment.”32 Accordingly, the 1974 amendment
extended protection beyond those individuals with actual disabilities to also
encompass individuals who are perceived, either correctly or incorrectly, as being
disabled.33 This revision demonstrated Congress’s concern with protecting the
handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but
also from “archaic attitudes and laws.”34
The federal courts generally adopted a broad reading of the disability
definition under the Rehabilitation Act. Professor Chai Feldblum, in reviewing
pre-ADA era decisions, summarized her findings as follows:
Courts deciding cases under [the Rehabilitation Act’s] definition had
decided that individuals with a wide range of serious medical conditions
could invoke the protections of the law. Indeed, courts had rarely even
parsed the language of the definition to decide whether a plaintiff was a
“handicapped individual” under the law. Rather, the definition was
understood to include any medical condition that was non-trivial, and the
courts had applied the law’s coverage in that manner.35
The Supreme Court appeared to concur in this assessment. In School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court described the act’s definition as
“broad” and explained that by extending the definition to include those regarded as
handicapped, “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment.”36 Professor Feldblum interpreted this language as
meaning that the “regarded as” prong was sufficiently broad to cover “any
individual who had been discriminated against because of any impairment.”37
When Congress debated the proposed Americans with Disabilities Act in
1989 and 1990, legislative committee reports explained that the definition of
disability borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act was meant to incorporate the
31

Id.
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111, 88 Stat. 1617,
1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006)).
33
S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 37–39, 63–64 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6388–6390, 6413–6414.
34
Id. at 50.
35
Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-discrimination Law:
What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L.
91, 91–92 (2000).
36
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
37
Feldblum, supra note 35, at 94.
32
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prevailing judicial and regulatory interpretation given the latter provision.38 The
“interpretative guidance” adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) following the enactment of the ADA explicitly made this
link as well, finding “that the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation
Act [is] generally applicable to the term ‘disability’ as used in the ADA.”39 With
specific reference to the “regarded as” prong of the proposed ADA definition, a
House Report stated:
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on the basis of an
actual or perceived physical or mental condition, and the employer can
articulate no legitimate job-related reason for the rejection, a perceived
concern about employing persons with disabilities would be inferred and
the plaintiff could qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test.40
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 using essentially the
same definition as in the Rehabilitation Act except with the term “disability”
substituted for the term “handicapped.”41 Under the ADA, “the term ‘disability’
means, with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”42 As a general rule of construction, the ADA provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.43
Following the ADA’s enactment, the EEOC issued both formal regulations44
and “Interpretive Guidance”45 with respect to the ADA’s employment provisions.46
38

See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 21 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1238, 1258;
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990); see also Feldblum, supra note 35, at 126–29
(explaining that disability advocates concurred in the decision to borrow the Rehabilitation
Act’s definition for the ADA because of the broad interpretation that definition had
received).
39
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (2010). Throughout this Article, the appendix
to Part 1630 will be referred to as “Interpretive Guidance.”
40
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30–31 (1990).
41
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §3(2), 104 Stat. 327,
329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006)).
42
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
43
Id. § 12201(a).
44
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 to .16.
45
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1 to .16.
46
The ADA provisions relating to employment are contained in Title I of the act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117.
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In terms of the reach of the ADA’s “regarded as” prong, the EEOC Interpretive
Guidance expressed the following view:
An individual rejected from a job because of the “myths, fears and
stereotypes” associated with disabilities would be covered under this part
of the definition of disability, whether or not the employer’s or other
covered entity’s perception were shared by others in the field and
whether or not the individual’s actual physical or mental condition would
be considered a disability under the first or second part of this
definition.47
The Interpretive Guidance goes on to conclude that an individual will be
covered by the “regarded as” prong if he or she “can show that an employer made
an employment decision because of a perception of disability based on ‘myth, fear
or stereotype.’”48
At this point, many activists and observers were optimistic that the ADA was
structured to go a long way toward achieving the stated objective of eradicating
disability discrimination.49 And, the “regarded as” prong was a major weapon in
this arsenal, providing a safety valve of coverage for many individuals who did not
otherwise qualify as having a current, functionally limited disability.50
But the optimists overlooked one important fact: unlike the all-encompassing
nature of race and gender under Title VII, the notion of disability under ADA is a
term of limitation.51 While everyone has a race and gender, not everyone is
disabled. If the threshold for establishing disability status is raised, the scope of
protection afforded by the Act is correspondingly reduced.
III. JUDICIAL BACKLASH: THE SHRINKING CLASS OF THE DISABLED
The enactment of the ADA contributed to a significant rise in the incidence of
employment litigation. In the four years following 1991, the number of
employment claims in federal court jumped by 128%.52 Between the ADA’s
effective date in 1992 and the end of fiscal year 1998, claimants filed more than

47

29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l).
Id. The interpretive guidance further states that “[i]f the employer cannot articulate
a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, an inference that the employer is
acting on the basis of ‘myth, fear or stereotype’ can be drawn.” Id.
49
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
50
See Feldblum, supra note 35, at 157.
51
See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination
Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 69 (1999).
52
See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of
Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22 (1997).
48
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108,000 charges of disability discrimination with the EEOC.53 This litigation
explosion, coupled with the rather imprecise language of the statute, resulted in
conflicting judicial interpretations on a host of key ADA issues54 and led the
Supreme Court to decide sixteen cases construing the ADA in a relatively short
time span from 1998 to 2004.55 This increased activity also tested the patience of
the federal judiciary charged with managing the caseload, as illustrated by the
following comment:
The court advised that the ADA as it was being interpreted had the
potential of being the greatest generator of litigation ever, and that the
court doubted whether Congress, in its wildest dreams or wildest
nightmares, intended to turn every garden variety worker’s compensation
claim into a federal case.56
Perhaps as a partial response to the burdens of this growing caseload, federal
court decisions began to adopt a more restrictive view of the ADA’s disability
definition. By 1997, Arlene Mayerson, directing attorney of the Disability Rights
Education and Defense Fund, authored an article disquietly chronicling the fact
that a growing number of federal courts were imposing a functional limitation on
the “regarded as” prong.57 Under this approach, courts would find a plaintiff to
have standing only if the impairment that an employer perceived an employee to
possess would result in a substantial limitation on a major life activity.58 From

53

See Befort & Thomas, supra note 51, at 29–30 (citing Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges 1992FY 1998).
54
See generally id. (describing ten contentious ADA issues on which the circuit
courts and/or the EEOC took conflicting positions and also discussing the reasons for this
widespread judicial dissonance).
55
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,
540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,
446 n.6 (2003); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2002); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406
(2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296–98 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,
690 (2001); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001);
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
492–94 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805–07 (1999);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 647 (1998); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
213 (1998).
56
Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rev’d, 60 F.3d
1300 (8th Cir. 1995).
57
See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong: Giving
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 590–91 (1997).
58
Id. at 592–95.
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Mayerson’s perspective, this additional requirement was never intended by the
ADA’s drafters,59 and it was one that few plaintiffs could meet.60
This was only the precursor of a much larger judicial backlash. Beginning in
1999, the Supreme Court issued four decisions that severely narrowed the class of
protected “disabled” employees.
A. The Supreme Court Cases
The first and most significant of these decisions was the landmark case of
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.61 Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton were twin
sisters who both suffered from severe myopia.62 Each had uncorrected visual
acuity of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other, but with corrective lenses their
vision improved to 20/20 or better.63 In 1992, both sisters applied for employment
with United Air Lines (United) as commercial airline pilots.64 United rejected both
sisters because they did not meet minimum uncorrected vision requirements.65
Petitioners brought suit under the ADA, alleging that they fit within the protected
class of individuals with a disability due to their respective vision impairments
(prong one), or, alternatively, because they were regarded as having a substantially
limiting impairment (prong three).66
The key issue in determining the twins’ prong one disability claim concerned
whether mitigating measures should be considered in determining whether a
person is substantially limited in a major life activity.67 The EEOC had issued
Interpretive Guidance suggesting that the issue of disability status should be
assessed without regard to mitigating measures.68 Under this approach, for
example, an individual with diabetes who could perform normally with insulin
injections, but who without insulin would lapse into a coma, would be considered
disabled and thus protected by the ADA. The Sutton Court, in a 7-2 decision,
disagreed, stating:
It is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct for, or
mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those
measures—both positive and negative—must be taken into account when
judging whether that person is “substantially limited” in a major life
activity and thus “disabled” under the Act.69
59

Id. at 597–98.
Id. at 590–91, 599.
61
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
62
Id. at 475.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 476.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 481–82.
68
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
69
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
60
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The Court rejected the agency guidance as an “impermissible interpretation of
the ADA.”70 The Court reasoned that a person whose impairment is corrected by
mitigating measures does not have an impairment that presently substantially
limits a major life activity, and therefore should not be considered disabled under
the ADA.71 The Court also stressed the importance of making an individualized
inquiry with respect to each person asserting an ADA claim. The Court opined that
following the EEOC’s instruction to assess claimants in an uncorrected state would
impermissibly create a system in which persons would be treated as members of a
group rather than as individuals.72 Finally, the Court placed great weight on
congressional findings set out in the ADA’s preamble to the effect that the Act
would protect some forty-three million Americans.73 The Court explained that this
figure would be much higher if all persons with corrected conditions were intended
to be covered by the statute.74
The Supreme Court also rejected the alternative contention that the twins were
protected under the ADA because they were regarded as disabled. The Sutton
majority explained that an individual may fall within this “regarded as” prong of
the statutory disability definition in either of two ways: “(1) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities.”75 In either situation, the Court explained, the impairment, as perceived,
must be one that substantially limits one or more major life activities.76 Applying
that standard to the Sutton facts, the Court ruled that the mere allegation that an
employer has a vision requirement does not establish that the employer regarded
the petitioners as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.77 At
best, the Court stated, the employer only regarded them as unable to perform the
single job of a global airline pilot.78
The Court issued two companion decisions on the same day as Sutton that
reached similar results. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court held
that a mechanic with hypertension was not disabled or regarded as disabled when

70

Id.
Id. at 482–83.
72
Id. at 483–84.
73
See id. at 484 (discussing congressional findings set out in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1)).
74
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
75
Id. at 489.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 490–91. According to the EEOC regulations, in order for an individual to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, he or she must be “significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010).
78
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
71
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evaluated after considering the mitigating effect of his medication.79 In the other
case, Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Court held that whether monocular
vision is a covered disability must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account mitigating measures including the brain’s ability to compensate for
the loss of vision in one eye.80
The Court further restricted the disability standing requirement three years
later in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc v. Williams when it overturned
a Sixth Circuit decision that had found an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel
syndrome and tendonitis to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks
because of her workplace difficulties in gripping tools and in performing repetitive
work.81 The Supreme Court explained that the proper inquiry was to determine
whether an individual has “an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from [engaging in] activities that are of central importance to [daily
life].”82 The Court stated that the terms “substantially limits” and “major life
activity” “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled.”83 The Court determined that the Sixth Circuit had engaged
in an overly narrow inquiry by considering only those tasks that Williams
performed at work, while ignoring the impairment’s impact on her nonwork
activities.84 Since a broader view revealed that Williams could still perform
household chores and personal hygiene activities, the Court concluded that the
appeals court had erred in finding that she was substantially limited in performing
manual tasks and hence disabled for purposes of the ADA.85
B. The Impact
Although some critics perceived these decisions as wisely preserving the
protections of the ADA for those who truly are disabled,86 most of the scholarly
response was decidedly negative. The loudest detractors, including some long-time
disability rights activists, viewed these decisions as subverting the bold civil rights
intent of Congress in enacting the ADA.87 The clear consensus reaction, even from
79

Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1999).
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–67 (1999).
81
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 192–93 (2002).
82
Id. at 196–98.
83
Id. at 196–97.
84
Id. at 200–01.
85
Id. at 201–02. The Court remanded the issue of whether Toyota Motors was entitled
to summary judgment on the manual task issue. See id. at 202–03.
86
See, e.g., Andrew C. Testerman, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: The Supreme
Court Applies “Corrective” and “Mitigating” Common Sense to the ADA, 77 DENV. U. L.
REV. 165, 168 (1999) (arguing that the Sutton decision provides “a rational and reasoned
interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability resulting in a narrowed protected class
that more closely identifies the intended beneficiaries of the Act”).
87
See, e.g., Diller, supra note 5, at 22 (suggesting that Sutton and similar rulings
demonstrate that the federal courts are engaged in a judicial backlash that is “systematically
80
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those commentators outside the disability advocate community, was that the
Supreme Court decisions cut too deep a swath into the ADA’s protected class.88
The four Supreme Court decisions discussed above negatively impacted
disability discrimination jurisprudence in at least three ways: narrowing the ADA’s
coverage, spawning uncertainty, and enabling decisions based on stereotypes.
1. Narrowing the ADA’s Coverage
The most obvious impact of these decisions was to narrow the ADA’s
protected class and to raise the bar for ADA plaintiffs in litigation. This impact is
demonstrated by several statistical measures. First, the timing of the Sutton
decision correlates with a significant decline in the number of charges of alleged
discrimination filed under the ADA. The EEOC’s charge-filing statistics show a
drop in annual ADA charges from the 17,000 to 18,000 range during fiscal years
1997 to 1999 to a range of 15,000 to 16,000 charges filed in each of the four fiscal
years following the Sutton decision.89 Federal court filings for employment-based
civil rights cases similarly declined from 23,735 in 199890 to 20,955 in 2002 and
14,353 in 2006.91 These numbers suggest that Sutton and its progeny serve to deter
the assertion of discrimination claims under the ADA.
Second, several empirical studies found that the federal courts see little merit
in those ADA claims that are asserted. Professor Ruth Colker, for example, has
conducted a detailed analysis of decided ADA federal court decisions and reported
that the courts have resolved approximately 93% of these cases in favor of
employers.92 Many of these decisions are the result of summary judgment rulings
based upon a determination that the plaintiff lacks disability status.93 Another study
undertaken by Professor Colker revealed that the federal courts of appeal are far

nullifying rights that Congress conferred on people with disabilities”); Feldblum, supra
note 35, at 161 (describing a “large, gaping wound” inflicted by Sutton and its companion
cases).
88
See, e.g., Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A
Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1072 (1999); Wendy E. Parmet, Plain
Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 54 (2000).
89
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Charges (Includes Concurrent Charges
with Title VII, ADEA, and EPA) FY 1997-FY 2009, U.S. EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
90
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 133 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
JudicialBusiness2002.aspx (follow “Table C-2A” hyperlink).
91
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 166 (2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness
2006.aspx (follow “Table C-2A” hyperlink).
92
Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999).
93
See id. at 110–17; Befort & Thomas, supra note 51, at 80.
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more likely to overturn trial court rulings favorable to ADA plaintiffs than they are
to take similar action with respect to appeals arising under Title VII.94
2. Spawning Uncertainty
Even though one of the Supreme Court’s apparent purposes in issuing these
four decisions was to stem the rising tide of litigation under the ADA, certain
aspects of these decisions actually caused more uncertainty and created the need
for a continued reliance on the courts for interpretation of ADA intent. The two
most significant of these factors were a lack of agency deference and the
requirement of an individualized inquiry in determining disability status.
(a) Lack of Agency Deference
The Sutton majority’s treatment of EEOC regulatory guidance raised serious
doubts as to the future authority of the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance. Given the
ADA’s sparse and imprecise text, the panoply of EEOC interpretations offered
perhaps the most useful roadmap available. The Sutton Court’s rejection of this
agency guidance blurred that map to a considerable extent.
Under the Supreme Court’s well-known Chevron doctrine, announced in
1984, a reviewing court should adhere to an agency’s regulatory interpretation
where a statute is silent or ambiguous and the agency interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.95 The Court in Sutton markedly withheld
such deference to the EEOC in a number of ways. Most directly, the Court
dismissed the position of the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance with respect to
mitigating measures as “an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”96 Beyond
directly rejecting the EEOC’s view on the mitigating measures issue, the Sutton
opinion also raised two other warning flags concerning the status of agency
94

Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 253–54 (2001).
95
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984). In an earlier ADA decision, the Court invoked the Chevron doctrine in stating that
the regulatory views of the administrative agencies charged with interpreting and enforcing
the ADA “are entitled to deference.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) (stating
that because agencies directed by Congress issue implementing regulations and provide
technical assistance concerning the ADA, the “views [of the EEOC and the Department of
Justice] are entitled to deference”).
96
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Although some courts
have suggested that the EEOC’s interpretive guidance is not entitled to full Chevron
deference because that document is an interpretive guideline rather than a substantive
regulation, see, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 n.3 (10th Cir.
1997), it is clear that the interpretive guidance, as the enforcing agency’s interpretation
adopted following notice and comment procedures, is entitled, at least, to some deference.
See Colker, supra note 92, at 153–56 (arguing that the Interpretive Guidance deserves a
high level of deference due to the EEOC’s adoption of the guidelines as an appendix to
regulations promulgated in accordance with formal notice and comment procedures).
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guidance under the ADA. First, the Sutton Court suggested that agency
promulgations concerning the definition of a covered disability may not be legally
authorized.97 More narrowly, the Sutton opinion expressed doubt as to the validity
of the portion of the EEOC’s regulations that set out the agency’s views as to when
an individual has standing under the ADA because of a substantial limitation on
the major life activity of “working.”98 The Court expressed similar doubts on these
two issues in Toyota.99
By rejecting the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance with respect to mitigating
measures and suggesting (without deciding) that the EEOC’s regulations
concerning the meaning of “disability” and “working” may be invalid, the Court
fueled judicial reluctance to follow agency guidance. In short, the Court’s
decisions called the EEOC’s power to issue authoritative guidance into question
and fostered an ongoing climate of unpredictability and litigiousness.
(b) Individualized Inquiry
The Supreme Court’s insistence on an individualized inquiry for determining
disability status under the ADA also fosters unpredictability. In rejecting agency
guidance with respect to the impact of mitigating measures, the Sutton Court
stated, “The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated ‘with
respect to an individual’ and be determined based on whether an impairment
substantially limits the ‘major life activities of such individual.’ Thus, whether a
person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry.”100 The Court
97

While recognizing that Congress authorized three different agencies to issue
regulations concerning those portions of the ADA that they are entrusted to administer, the
Court stated: “No agency, however, has been given authority to issue regulations
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, see §§ 12101–12102, which
fall outside Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated authority to interpret
the term ‘disability.’” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. Because neither party challenged the validity
of the agency regulations on this ground, the Court concluded that it need not decide how
much deference they are due. Id. at 480.
98
Id. at 492. In this regard, the Court stated:
Because the parties accept that the term “major life activities” includes
working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations. We note,
however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining “major life
activities” to include work, for it seems “‘to argue in a circle to say that if one is
excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment from working with others]
. . . then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you’re
asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap.”’
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Sch. Bd. of Nassau
Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85–1227) (argument of Solicitor General)).
99
See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194, 200 (2002).
100
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (internal citation omitted). The Sutton Court concluded that
the guidelines approach was inconsistent with such an individualized inquiry because it
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in Toyota similarly stressed that an individualized inquiry is particularly necessary
when the impairment at issue, like carpal tunnel syndrome, varies widely in
symptoms from person to person.101
While the Supreme Court viewed this individualized focus as beneficial, that
certainly is a debatable proposition. At the standing stage of ADA litigation, a
certain degree of predictability is a good thing: both employees and employers
would benefit from knowing generally what types of impairments the ADA covers.
An individualized focus in each and every case clearly is not conducive to that end.
Under an individualized inquiry approach, individuals with the same
impairment may or may not be disabled for ADA purposes, depending upon the
degree of limitation that each individual experiences because of the impairment.102
The Sutton Court’s mitigating measures determination aggravates this uncertainty.
Even though corrective measures may render many impairments nondisabling,
some employees nonetheless may be disabled because medication and treatment
are ineffective to relieve their substantial limitation.103 In addition, the side effects
of a treatment regimen itself could cause a substantial limitation in a major life
activity.104 Finally, an open question exists as to the status of employees who
could, but chose not to, use mitigating measures.105 Since the individualized
approach inhibits the accumulation of precedent in terms of determining disability
status, it invites continual litigation to resolve uncertain rights and obligations.

“would create a system in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of
people with similar impairments, rather than as individuals.” Id. at 483–84.
101
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199.
102
See Feldblum, supra note 35, at 152 (“[T]he idea that an individualized assessment
would be used to determine whether one person with epilepsy would be covered under the
law, while another person with epilepsy would not, was completely foreign both to Section
504 jurisprudence and to the spirit of the ADA as envisioned by its advocates.”).
103
See, e.g., Belk v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1999)
(involving a plaintiff required to wear leg braces); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.,
184 F.3d 296, 301–02 (3d Cir. 1999) (involving a plaintiff with a mental disorder).
104
See, e.g., McAlindin v. Cnty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that side effects of mental health medications can result in substantial impairment);
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 309 (noting that side effects of mental health medications can result in
substantial impairment).
105
See Sarina Maria Russotto, Effects of the Sutton Trilogy, 68 TENN. L. REV. 705,
716 (2001). See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. 217 (2004) (arguing that employees should be under a
duty to mitigate when doing so is reasonable and reduces their need for workplace
accommodation); Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who
Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1981
(2002) (arguing that nonmitigating employees are entitled to ADA protection from
employment discrimination).
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3. Enabling Decisions Based on Stereotypes
The Supreme Court’s resolution of the specific issue presented by the facts in
Sutton is not surprising. The use of eyeglasses is so common and so successful that
their presence does not evoke negative stereotypical perceptions concerning the
ability of an eyeglass-wearer to function in society.106 But other impairments, such
as missing limbs, epilepsy, and depression do evoke stereotypical assumptions that
may hinder full participation in society and in the workplace. The Sutton Court’s
one-size-fits-all response to the matter of mitigating measures, unfortunately,
treated these significant conditions in the same manner as the comparatively slight
inconvenience of correctible nearsightedness.107
The Sutton and Murphy decisions created a particularly troublesome issue
with respect to the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability definition. The
Court in Sutton explained that an individual is regarded as disabled if an employer
mistakenly believes that a person’s nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one
or more major life activities.108 On the other hand, the Sutton opinion ruled that an
individual is not regarded as disabled simply because an employer believes that a
person’s nonlimiting impairment precludes him or her from adequately performing
the job at issue.109 The crucial distinction, then, is the employer’s subjective
perception.
Here again, this subjective inquiry may mean that two individuals who are
similarly situated in terms of impairment could be treated disparately for ADA
standing purposes. Take for example the situation of Karen Sutton and her twin
sister Kimberly Hinton: each sister has uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or
worse that is correctable with corrective lenses to 20/20 vision.110 Assume that
United Air Lines decides not to hire Karen because it perceives her eyesight
impairment as interfering with her ability to perform adequately as a global airline
pilot. Also assume that United Air Lines decides not to hire Kimberly because it
perceives her eyesight impairment as interfering with her ability to perform
adequately across a class or broad range of jobs including that of a global airline
pilot. With these assumptions, under the reasoning of the Sutton majority,
Kimberly has standing as an individual with a disability whereas Karen does not.
As a subjective inquiry, this individualized focus concerning the “regarded as”
106

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L.
REV. 397, 446, 496–97 (2000) (arguing that the class of “disabled” should include those
individuals with impairments that subject them to systematic disadvantages in society, but
concluding that individuals who wear corrective lenses are not subject to stigma in society
at large).
107
See Befort, supra note 27, at 357–58.
108
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999); see also Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999) (reiterating the finding of the Sutton
Court).
109
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494.
110
Id. at 475.
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prong inhibited predictability and was prone to post hoc manipulation with respect
to the purported rationale for employment decisions.111
As the Supreme Court recognized in an earlier decision, School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, a central purpose of disability discrimination legislation
is to deter employment decisions based on “society’s accumulated myths and fears
about disability.”112 The overly broad swath cut by the Sutton decision was
inconsistent with this policy objective. Based on Sutton, an employer would not
violate the ADA by deciding not to hire an insulin-aided diabetic or an individual
wearing a prosthetic limb based upon a mistaken and stereotypic belief that the
applicant’s underlying impairment might somehow interfere with successful job
performance. A post-Sutton court hearing such a case would never reach the issues
of stereotypical decision making or ability to perform the job because the
applicants did not have standing as individuals with a disability.
IV. SEARCHING FOR A FIX
A. Scholarly Proposals
Much of the widespread criticism of these four Supreme Court decisions
narrowing the scope of the ADA’s definition of disability has been accompanied
by proposals for reform. A brief summary of some of the most frequently
mentioned proposals is set out below.
The most far-reaching proposal would extend ADA protection to any
individual with a physical or mental impairment, or to anyone who is regarded as
having such an impairment.113 This proposal would confer standing upon any
individual with an actual or perceived impairment regardless of whether the
impairment resulted in any functional limitation on that individual’s ability to
engage in any activity.114 A variation of this proposal would protect all individuals
with an impairment that somehow limits a major life activity but would eliminate
the troublesome “substantial limitation” requirement.115 The proponents of these
approaches maintain that this change would mirror Title VII in terms of focusing

111

According to Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in Sutton, Congress intended that
impairments should be viewed in their unmitigated state under prong one of the disability
definition because of the difficulty of ascertaining an employer’s subjective intent under
prong three. See id. at 501 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By rejecting this viewpoint, the
Court in Sutton amplified the importance of this difficult prong three inquiry.
112
480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
113
See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities:
The Failure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1473–74 (1999); Feldblum, supra note 35, at 162–64.
114
See Eichhorn, supra note 113, at 1473–74.
115
Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 128–29 (2000).
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attention on an employer’s reasons for its employment action rather than focusing
on whether an employee is a member of the “substantially limited” subset.116
A second proposed alternative would be to define the ADA’s protected class
in light of the act’s antisubordination purpose. In this vein, Professor Miranda
McGowan, while agreeing with the Sutton Court’s mitigating measures ruling,
urges a broader reading of the “regarded as” prong, stating “it should suffice that
an employer holds and acts on the basis of stereotypes or generalizations about the
abilities (or dangers) of a person with an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment.”117 Professor Samuel Bagenstos puts it more broadly, contending that
“the statutory ‘disability’ category should embrace those actual, past, and
perceived impairments that subject people to systemic disadvantages in society.”118
A narrower third alternative would be for Congress to legislatively overrule
the Sutton decision on the mitigating measures issue. A number of state laws
provide a model for this approach.119 In California, for example, a 2000
amendment to the state Fair Employment and Housing Act provides that “whether
a condition limits a major life activity shall be determined without respect to any
mitigating measures, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life
activity.”120 The Rhode Island legislature has enacted a similar measure.121
A fourth alternative proposed by a group of legal and medical experts from
the University of Louisville suggests that Congress should direct the EEOC to
establish medical standards for determining when most common mental and
physical impairments are sufficiently severe to constitute a covered disability for
ADA purposes.122 These standards would be premised upon medical practice
guidelines and standard diagnostic and treatment protocols following notice and
comment rulemaking procedures.123 An individual whose medical condition met a
promulgated standard would presumptively be covered by the ADA.124
116

See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 113, at 1473–74; Feldblum, supra note 35, at 162–

64.
117

Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act,
35 GA. L. REV. 27, 113 (2000).
118
Bagenstos, supra note 106, at 445.
119
See generally Alex Long, State Anti-discrimination Law as a Model for Amending
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 643 (2004).
120
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(c) (West 2005).
121
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(4) (2004).
122
Mark A. Rothstein, Serge A. Martinez & W. Paul McKinney, Using Established
Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 270–71 (2002).
123
Id.
124
Id. According to the authors, this general rule would be subject to three exceptions:
First, for conditions without a published medical standard, an individual could nonetheless
assert a claim of disability discrimination by establishing the existence of an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 271.
Second, an employer could rebut the presumption of coverage for an employee whose
condition satisfied the published criteria by presenting clear and convincing evidence that
the individual’s condition did not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity.
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B. Congress Takes Action
In January 2002, Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD) authored an piece in
the Washington Post.125 Representative Hoyer expressed his belief that the ADA
had been misconstrued by the Supreme Court and stated that Congress’s
“responsibility now is to revisit both our words and our intent in passing the ADA.
In matters of statutory interpretation, unlike constitutional matters, Congress has
the last word.”126 Representative Hoyer’s attitude was shared by many others, and
as a result, Congress and disability rights groups began paving the way for
legislation aimed at remedying the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA.127
The National Council on Disability issued an important report two years later
recommending that the ADA be amended to define a covered disability as any
physical or mental impairment.128
A major legislative development occurred during the summer of 2006 when
Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) expressed interest in sponsoring a bill
that would override the Supreme Court’s limiting decisions.129 In September of
that year, Congressman Sensenbrenner joined Representatives Hoyer and John
Conyers (D-MI) in sponsoring the first ADA Restoration Act, H.R. 6258.130
On July 26, 2007, companion ADA Restoration bills were introduced in the
House (H.R. 3195) and in the Senate (S. 1881).131 The bills reflected language that
the disability community had crafted.132 Most significantly, H.R. 3195 proposed
amending the ADA’s definition of disability to mean: “(i) a physical or mental
impairment; (ii) a record of a physical or mental impairment; or (iii) being
regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.”133 This proposed definition
of disability did not require that such an impairment pose any functional limitation
on life activities.134

Id. Similarly, employees who do not satisfy the presumptive standard could nonetheless
establish covered disability status by presenting clear and convincing evidence that his or
her impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Id. at 271–72.
125
Steny H. Hoyer, Op-Ed., Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O’Connor,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at B1.
126
Id.
127
See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 194–95.
128
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 99–104 (2004), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf.
129
See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 195. Representative Sensenbrenner’s wife,
Cheryl Sensenbrenner, was a board member of the American Association of People with
Disabilities and an ardent supporter of disability rights. Id. at 195–96.
130
H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. (2006).
131
H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1881, 110th Cong. (2007).
132
See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 197–98.
133
H.R. 3195 § 4.
134
See id.
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A number of business groups expressed opposition to the companion bills.135
In testimony before a Senate Committee in November 2007, for example, a
management attorney expressed the concern that S. 1881 would convey standing to
any individual with an impairment, no matter how trivial the impairment, and that
individuals with minor impairments would be entitled to reasonable
accommodations.136 This blanket entitlement to accommodations, the attorney
opined, would cause considerable difficulty and expense for employers.137
Representatives Hoyer and Sensenbrenner urged disability and business
leaders to work out their differences.138 From February to May of 2008,
representatives of these two groups held numerous meetings and exchanged
several drafts of proposed language.139 They finally achieved a compromise on
May 15, 2008,140 retaining the ADA’s current definition of disability but including
several measures designed to lower the bar for a plaintiff to establish a substantial
limitation on a major life activity.141 A particularly significant component of the
compromise concerned the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition. The
Statement of the Managers accompanying the bill enacted as the ADAAA
summarized the essential ingredients of this compromise as follows:
The bill removes from the third “regarded as” prong of the disability
definition the requirement that an individual demonstrate that he or she
has, or is perceived to have, an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity. Under the bill, therefore, an individual can establish
coverage under the law by showing that he or she has been subjected to
an action prohibited under the Act because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment. Because the bill thus broadens
application of this third prong of the disability definition, entities covered
by the ADA will not be required to provide accommodations or to
modify policies and procedures for individuals who fall solely under the
third prong. Such entities will, however, still be subject to discrimination
claims.142

135

See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 234–35.
The Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1881
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 110th Cong. 1–2, 6 (2007)
(statement of Camille A. Olson, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP).
137
See id. at 6.
138
See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 229.
139
Id. at 229–30. As the Statement of the Managers accompanying the bill enacted as
the ADAAA described: “S. 3406 is the product of an extensive bipartisan effort that
included many hours of meetings and negotiation by legislative staff as well as by
stakeholders including the disability, business, and education communities.” 154 CONG.
REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
140
See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 230.
141
Id. at 236.
142
154 CONG. REC. S8344.
136
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A slightly revised version of the ADAA was introduced on July 31, 2008 as S.
3406.143 Both houses of Congress passed the bill unanimously,144 and President
Bush signed the ADAAA into law on September 25, 2008.145
V. THE ADAAA
The ADAAA, which went into effect on January 1, 2009,146 explicitly
disavows the reasoning of the four Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the
scope of the ADA’s disability definition.147 Although the ADA’s basic definition
of disability remains intact, the ADAAA emphasizes that the definition of
disability should be broadly construed148 and clarifies how the terms “substantially
limits,” “major life activities,” and “regarded as” are to be construed.149 A principal
objective of the ADAAA is to refocus the ADA on issues of discrimination rather
than on issues of standing.150
A. The ADAAA’s Definition of Disability
According to the ADAAA, “the term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an
individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”151 Thus, the ADA’s prior
three-pronged definition of disability has largely been retained.152 The definition’s
meaning, however, has been clarified and expanded in several ways.

143

S. 3406, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008).
154 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H8286 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 2008).
145
See ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553.
146
ADAAA, sec. 8.
147
See id. sec. 2(b) (3)-(5).
148
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)) (“The
definition of disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”).
149
See infra Part V.A.
150
See 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
151
ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(1)(A)–(C) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A)–(C)).
152
H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007), as passed by the House of Representatives,
proposed replacing the term “substantially limits” with the phrase “materially restricts.”
The Senate sponsors jettisoned this change in language, concluding “that adopting a new,
undefined term that is subject to widely disparate meanings is not the best way to achieve
the goal of ensuring consistent and appropriately broad coverage under this Act.”
154 CONG. REC. S8345.
144
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1. Substantially Limits
The ADAAA explicitly states that one of the purposes of the Act is to reject
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “substantially limits” in Sutton and Toyota
because it “created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain
coverage under the ADA.”153 Specifically, the ADAAA rejects the rule enunciated
in Toyota that the terms “substantially” and “major” “need to be interpreted strictly
to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” and that to be
substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA “an
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s
daily lives.”154 Accordingly, the ADAAA states that “the primary object of
attention . . . should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied
with their obligations, and . . . the question of whether an individual’s impairment
is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.”155
In order to achieve this goal, the ADAAA amends the ADA’s definition of the
term “substantially limits” in several ways. First, the ADAAA “deletes two
findings in the ADA which led the Supreme Court to unduly restrict the meaning
and application of the definition of disability.”156 The deleted findings stated that
“some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities”
and that “individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority.”157 By
deleting these findings, Congress intended to remove “this barrier to construing
and applying the definition of disability more generously.”158
Second, the ADAAA rejects the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
Sutton trilogy “that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures. ”159 Such measures include:
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision
devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses),
prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear
implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or
oxygen therapy equipment and supplies; (II) use of assistive technology;

153

ADAAA, sec. 2(b)(5).
Id. sec. 2(b)(4) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
197, 198 (2002)).
155
Id. sec. 2(b)(5).
156
154 CONG. REC. S8344.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
ADAAA, sec. 2(b)(2) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475
(1999)).
154
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(III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or (IV)
learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.160
The ADAAA, however, recognizes an exception in that “the ameliorative
effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be
considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.”161 The ADAAA provides that, notwithstanding the above language, “a
covered entity shall not use qualification standards, employment tests, or other
selection criteria based on an individual’s uncorrected vision unless the standard,
test, or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be jobrelated for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”162
Third, the ADAAA addresses the challenges that some individuals have faced
when trying to establish that they have a substantially limiting impairment when
that condition is episodic in nature. According to a rule of construction
incorporated in the ADAAA, “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”163 This
change is noteworthy because the “Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
courts should refrain from engaging in hypothetical inquiries as to the severity of
impairments and instead must focus on the individual in his or her present state.”164
As a result of this change, however, courts are directed to speculate as to an
impairment’s future course when considering whether an episodic impairment
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.
Lastly, although the ADAAA does not explicitly define the meaning of
“substantially limits,” it does state “that the current Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term ‘substantially limits’
as ‘significantly restricted’ are inconsistent with congressional intent, by
expressing too high a standard.”165 Accordingly, the ADAAA expresses
Congress’s expectation that the EEOC “will revise that portion of its current
regulations that defines the term ‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly restricted’ to
be consistent with [the ADAAA].”166
2. Major Life Activities
Under the ADA, the determination of whether an activity constitutes a major
life activity was left to the EEOC and the courts.167 The ADAAA changes this by
including in the statute an illustrative list of major life activities. The activities
160

Id. sec 4(a), §3(4)(E)(i) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)).
Id. sec. 4(a), §3(4)(E)(ii) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii)).
162
Id. sec. 5(c) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)).
163
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).
164
Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 217, 221 (2008).
165
ADAAA, sec. 2(a)(8) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note).
166
Id. sec. 2(b)(6) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note).
167
See Befort & Thomas, supra note 51, at 34.
161

1016

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

listed “include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.”168 In addition, the ADAAA explicitly includes major bodily functions in
the statutory definition of major life activities.169 As a result, some individuals will
be able to establish coverage under the Act without describing the activities in
which they are limited so long as they have a serious medical condition that results
in a substantial limitation on a major bodily function.
The ADAAA also contains a rule of construction that clarifies that “an
impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other
major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”170 According to the
congressional history, this was “intended to clarify that the ability to perform one
or more particular tasks within a broad category of activities does not preclude
coverage under the ADA.”171
3. The “Regarded As” Prong
The revised treatment of the “regarded as” prong is a central component of the
ADAAA compromise.172 One of Congress’s goals in enacting the ADAAA was to
reject the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sutton and “reinstate the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in [Arline,] which set forth a broad view of the third prong of
the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”173 As a result,
under the amended version of the statute, an individual meets the “regarded as”
prong of disability “if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected
to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity.”174 Accordingly, unlike the first and second prong of the
disability definition, courts will not have to address whether an impairment
functionally limits a major life activity when an individual is alleging
discrimination under the “regarded as” prong.175
168

ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(A) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)) (“[A] major life
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to,
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”).
170
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(C) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C)).
171
154 CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
172
See 154 CONG. REC. S8344.
173
ADAAA, sec. 2(b)(3) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note); see also supra
Part II.A.
174
Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)).
175
See 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (“Under this bill, the third prong of the disability
definition will apply to impairments, not only to disabilities. As such, it does not require a
functional test to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.”).
169
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As a compromise for this broad coverage, Congress inserted two important
statutory limitations. The first limitation is that the “regarded as” prong does “not
apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.”176 The second limitation is
that a reasonable accommodation does not need to be provided “to an individual
who meets the definition of disability . . . solely under” the “regarded as” prong.177
As a result, employers will only have to provide reasonable accommodations to
individuals who actually have an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity and not to individuals who are simply regarded as disabled.
The ADA’s latter limitation effectively resolves a circuit split that had existed
on the issue of whether an individual who is regarded as disabled is entitled to a
reasonable accommodation.178 The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had
ruled that employers do not have a duty to accommodate employees who only are
regarded as disabled.179 These courts generally focused on the “bizarre” windfall
that would result if employers were obligated to accommodate disabilities that do
not actually exist.180 The First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other
hand, had ruled that employers must provide reasonable accommodations to
employees regarded as disabled.181 These courts generally focused on the plain
language of the ADA and on the policy of trying to deter adverse actions based on
stereotypes.182 Under the “regarded as” compromise, Congress sided with the first
group of courts.
The pertinent legislative history provides some additional insights into
Congressional intent with regard to the “regarded as” compromise. While
Congress retained a somewhat watered-down “substantially limits” standard for
prong one coverage, it opted for a much broader prong three reach in order to
combat discrimination based on stereotypical perceptions.183 Under this approach,
the “regarded as” prong encompasses any individual who is treated adversely
because of an actual or perceived impairment, without regard for whether that
176

ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)).
Id. sec. 6(a)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)); see also 154 CONG. REC.
S8354 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“[S. 3406] balances [the expanded coverage of the
‘regarded as’ prong] by limiting the remedies available under this provision.”).
178
See generally Sarah J. Parrot, The ADA and Reasonable Accommodation of
Employees Regarded as Disabled: Statutory Fact or Bizarre Fiction?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
1495 (2006) (summarizing a prior circuit split on the issue of whether an individual who is
only “regarded as” disabled is entitled to a reasonable accommodation).
179
See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003); Weber
v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916–917 (8th Cir. 1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280
(5th Cir. 1998).
180
See, e.g., Weber, 186 F.3d at 916–17.
181
See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 773–74
(3d Cir. 2004).
182
See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005);
Kelly v. Metallics W. Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675–76 (10th Cir. 2005); Williams, 380 F.3d at
772–76; Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32–34 (1st Cir. 1996).
183
See 154 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
177

1018

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

impairment imposes any functional limitation on the individual’s activities.184
Significantly, “the ‘regarded as’ prong [now] focuses on how an individual is
treated, rather than on the difficult to prove perception of a covered entity.”185 As a
trade-off for this expanded coverage, the “regarded as” compromise relieves
employers from any responsibility for providing reasonable accommodations to
those who are disabled solely by virtue of the “regarded as” prong.186 The Senate
Statement of the Managers commented on this compromise, stating that while
“some members continue to have reservations about this [no required
accommodation] provision . . . we believe it is an acceptable compromise given
our strong expectation that such individuals would now be covered under the first
prong of the definition, properly applied.”187
B. Other Changes
1. On the Basis of Disability
The ADAAA altered the ADA’s antidiscrimination formula. Prior to the 2008
amendments, the statute provided that “no covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.”188 The ADAAA changed this general rule by deleting
the language “with a disability because of the disability of such individual,” and
replacing it with “on the basis of disability.”189 As a result, “the amendments
conform the ADAAA with the structure of Title VII and other civil rights laws.”190
According to the Senate’s Statement of the Managers Report, this change “ensures
that the emphasis in questions of disability discrimination is properly on the
critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has been discriminated against on the

184

See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 13 (2008).
See Feldblum et al., supra note 13, at 236.
186
154 CONG. REC. S8344 (“Because the bill thus broadens application of this third
prong of the disability definition, entities covered by the ADA will not be required to
provide accommodations or to modify policies and procedures for individuals who fall
solely under the third prong.”).
187
154 CONG. REC. S8347.
188
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
189
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a)(1), 122
Stat. 3553, 3557 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)) (“No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”).
190
Lawrence Lorber et al., Back to the Future: Restoring the ADA’s Original Intent,
HR ADVISOR, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 6, 10.
185
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basis of disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question of whether
a particular person is a ‘person with a disability.’”191
2. No Reverse Discrimination
The ADAAA also adds a provision stating that there can be no “reverse
discrimination” claims under the Act. Specifically, the ADAAA states that it does
not “provide the basis for a claim by an individual without a disability that the
individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual’s lack of
disability.”192 As a result, “nondisabled employees cannot claim [that they were
discriminated against] because they were treated less favorably or were not given
the same accommodations” as disabled employees.193
3. Regulatory Authority
In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated that that “no agency . . . has been given
authority to issue regulations implementing the [introductory] provisions of the
ADA, which fall outside Titles I-V.”194 Since the definition of disability appeared
in the general provisions of the ADA, the Court questioned the degree of deference
that it needed to give to the EEOC regulations.195 The ADAAA addressed this
issue by clarifying the scope of authority given to the EEOC to issue regulations
interpreting the disability definition. The Act now explicitly states that the
authority given to the EEOC, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of
Transportation to issue regulations “under this chapter includes the authority to
issue regulations implementing the definitions of disability in section 3 (including
rules of construction) and the definitions in section 4, consistent with the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008.”196 There is a chance, however, that this could result in
some confusion because “while all of these agencies are directed to broadly
interpret the law to cover persons with disabilities, they may do so with different
results unless they all agree to abide by the same set of regulations.”197

191

154 CONG. REC. S8347.
ADAAA, sec. 6(a)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g)).
193
Margaret Hart Edwards & Patrick F. Martin, Congress Tells the Courts How to
Interpret the ADA, ASAP (Littler Mendelson, P.C.), Sept. 2008, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/2008_09_ASAP_CongressTells_Cour
tsHowTo-InterpretADA.pdf.
194
527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (citation omitted).
195
Id. at 479–80.
196
ADAAA, sec. 6(a)(2) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205(a)).
197
John W. Parry & Amy L. Allbright, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Analysis
and Commentary, 32 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 695, 696 (2008).
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VI. LIKELY IMPACT AND LINGERING QUESTIONS
A. The Expanded Class of Individuals with a Disability
The most obvious impact of the ADAAA is that it broadly expands the class
of individuals considered to have a disability. It also readjusts the focus of the
ADA away from the troublesome issue of standing to that of determining the
substance of disability discrimination claims.
The ADAAA undoes much of the damage inflicted by the Supreme Court’s
four narrowing decisions. By systematically overriding the most egregious rulings
announced in these decisions, the ADAAA will inevitably extend the protections
of the ADA to a much larger class of disabled individuals.
A brief review of the major changes wrought by the ADAAA demonstrates
this point. Prior to the ADAAA, courts generally found that individuals who could
ameliorate the impact of an impairment by means of mitigating measures were not
disabled. Most courts, for example, applying the principles espoused in Sutton and
Murphy, concluded that individuals who could control their diabetes through
medication were not disabled.198 The ADAAA alters this analysis by now requiring
that the “determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures . . . .”199 As the Supreme Court noted in Sutton, “courts would almost
certainly find all diabetics to be disabled” if evaluated in an unmitigated state.200
Similar shifts in outcomes likely will result for other conditions that can be
ameliorated through medication, such as epilepsy and depression.
Similarly, most courts prior to the ADAAA found chronic illnesses that are
episodic in their symptoms were not disabling. For example, a number of courts
found cancer was not a disabling condition because its effects were episodic and
subject to periods of remission.201 The ADAAA alters this analysis by providing as
a rule of construction that “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”202 This
alteration likely means that far more individuals with episodic conditions,
including cancer, asthma, and hepatitis B, will now be covered by the ADA.

198

See, e.g., Greenburg v. Bellsouth Commc’ns, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir.
2007); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 2007); Scheerer v. Potter, 443
F.3d 916, 919–22 (7th Cir. 2006).
199
ADAAA, sec. 4(a), §3(4)(E)(i) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)).
200
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999); see also Arnold v.
United Parcel Serv. Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding, in a pre-Sutton
decision, an individual with diabetes to be disabled when evaluated in an unmitigated
state).
201
See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 507 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007); Ellison v.
Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190–91 (5th Cir. 1996).
202
ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(D) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(4)(D)).
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The ADAAA’s explicit recognition of an expanded set of major life activity
categories also will convey standing on more individuals with impairments.203 In
this regard, the ADAAA’s treatment of major bodily functions as major life
activities is particularly significant.204 Prior to the 2008 amendments, a bodily
function impairment constituted a disability only if that impairment substantially
limited some major life activity such as breathing, seeing, or working.205 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held that an individual with liver
failure was not disabled unless the individual could show that this bodily
impairment constituted a substantial limitation on some major life activity.206
Under the ADAAA, a substantial limitation on a bodily function itself is sufficient
for disability status.207
The ADAAA’s revision of the “regarded as” prong likely will constitute the
largest area of coverage expansion. Under Sutton and Murphy, an employee was
“regarded as” disabled only if the employer perceived the impairment as one that
substantially limited a major life activity.208 Thus, many courts found that
employers did not regard individuals with back problems as disabled when they
were perceived as unable to perform a single job as opposed to a class or broad
range of jobs.209 The ADAAA dramatically broadens the reach of the “regarded as”
prong to now encompass any individual who is treated adversely because of an
actual or perceived impairment, regardless of the impairment’s functional
impact.210 This change should provide protection against disability discrimination
to many individuals with bad backs, allergies, and carpal tunnel syndrome.
As a final measure, the congressional findings included in the ADAAA state
that the current EEOC regulations defining the term “substantially limits” set too
high a standard,211 and the Act expresses the expectation that the EEOC will revise
that portion of its regulations.212 The impact of this step is unclear at this point
since the regulations have not yet been promulgated, and it is unclear how much
deference the courts will give to the EEOC’s pronouncements once they are in
place. However, it is likely that this less specific step also will serve to expand the
ADA’s coverage.
203

See supra Part V.A.2.
ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 12102(2)(B)).
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See, e.g., Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 385 (3d. Cir. 2004) (ruling
that kidney failure may be disabling if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to
eliminate waste from the blood); Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401
(5th Cir. 2002) (ruling that positive HIV status was not disabling for an individual who did
not want to have any more children).
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See Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2001).
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ADAAA, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).
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See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2001); Dupre
v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Layfeyette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 2001).
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As the legislative history recites, a central purpose of the ADAAA expansion
in disability coverage is to ensure “that the emphasis in questions of disability
discrimination is properly on the critical inquiry of whether a qualified person has
been discriminated against on the basis of disability, and not unduly focused on the
preliminary question of whether a particular person is a ‘person with a
disability.’”213 As a practical matter, however, the new focus likely will center
more on whether an individual is qualified to perform the job in question. Unlike
Title VII cases in which the crucial question generally is whether an employer has
acted because of some protected trait, the crucial issue in most disability cases is
whether the plaintiff is qualified to perform the job in spite of his or her
disability.214 This switch in focus is a positive adjustment. Basing workplace
decisions on qualifications rather than preconceptions is a central tenet of
antidiscrimination legislation.215 An important corollary benefit of the ADAAA’s
expanded reach—particularly with regard to the reinvigorated scope of the
“regarded as” prong—is that it inhibits the type of stereotypical decision making
enabled by the Sutton and Murphy decisions.
In short, by expanding the class of individuals with a covered disability,
clarifying the EEOC’s regulatory authority, and reducing the possibility of
decisions based on stereotypes, the ADAAA effectively corrects most of the
damage done by the four errant Supreme Court cases discussed earlier in this
Article.216 The good news then is that the ADA once again appears poised to
provide “a national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”217
B. Lingering Questions
While the ADAAA clearly is a positive step for the proponents of disability
rights, some lingering questions remain. Most of these questions relate to the
“regarded as” compromise. The answers to these questions need to be monitored
carefully over the next few years to ensure that the judiciary does not again
undercut the affirmative civil rights mission of the ADA.
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154 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1185–87 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that the
issue of discriminatory causation is less significant in disability cases than in other types of
discrimination cases because employers in disability cases are more likely to admit that
their decision was disability-related, but then argue that the employee was unqualified due
to the disabling condition).
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See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (“Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the
controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What
Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not
the person in the abstract.”).
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See supra Part II.A.
217
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
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1. Do Individuals Who Are Regarded As Disabled Need a Reasonable
Accommodation in Order to Be Qualified for the Job?
Some commentators believe that individuals who only are regarded as
disabled do not need or deserve a reasonable accommodation. Professors Pamela
Karlan and George Rutherglen describe individuals wrongly perceived as disabled
as victims of “traditional [nondisability] discrimination” for whom reasonable
accommodation is an irrelevant concept.218 Professor Cheryl Anderson
recommends that individuals who are only “regarded as” disabled should not be
entitled to a reasonable accommodation because “no function of the individual is
impaired” and “the condition of the person has no real connection to the ability to
do the job.”219
A number of pre-ADAAA court decisions ruling that an employer had no
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation to an employee who is only
regarded as disabled share this view. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that a contrary interpretation would lead to “bizarre results” by entitling such an
employee “to accommodations for a non-disabling impairment that no similarly
situated employees would enjoy.”220 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that “to require accommodation for those not truly disabled would
compel employers to waste resources unnecessarily, when the employers’ limited
resources would be better spent assisting those persons who are actually disabled
and in genuine need of accommodation to perform to their potential.”221
Arguably, this view is correct for individuals who are mistakenly perceived to
have an impairment when, in fact, they have no impairment at all. But that is not
necessarily the case for an individual who “has a physical or mental impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered
entity as constituting such limitation.”222 Individuals who have an impairment that
is not substantially limiting may nonetheless need a reasonable accommodation to
be qualified for the job.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: Nancy is an employee who
works on an assembly line. Due to her carpal tunnel syndrome, she has difficulty in
making repetitive motions above shoulder height. This impairment, however, does
not substantially limit her ability to work in either a class of jobs or a broad range
of jobs. If her employer discharges or demotes Nancy because of her impairment,
she meets the test for disability under the “regarded as” prong of the amended
ADA, and she would be protected against these acts of discrimination if she were
qualified to perform the job.223 But under the “regarded as” compromise, she
would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation to assist her in being able to
218

See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996).
219
Anderson, supra note 115, at 132–33.
220
Weber v. Strippit, Inc. 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999).
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Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
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29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1) (2010).
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See supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text.
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perform this or another job. What type of reasonable accommodations might she
need? She might request a restructured work schedule to enable her to attend
physical therapy sessions. She might request the employer to reallocate the
performance of nonessential function, such as placing unneeded parts on a high
storage shelf, to another employee. Or she might request a reassignment to a
vacant position for which she is qualified. Each of these requests likely would
constitute a reasonable accommodation that an employer would be obligated to
provide for someone with a prong one or prong two disability,224 but they would
not be required to provide for someone like Nancy who is disabled solely under
prong three. If she were not qualified for the job without one of these
accommodations, the employer would not run afoul of the new ADA in
terminating Nancy’s employment.
This hypothetical demonstrates an undesirable subset of disability
discrimination that is permissible under the “regarded as” compromise. The overall
significance of this shortcoming depends on just how many individuals share
Nancy’s circumstances.
2. How Many Individuals with Impairments Who Need Reasonable
Accommodations Will Qualify for Prong One Disability Status?
The ADAAA’s legislative history indicates that legislators who had
misgivings about relinquishing the reasonable accommodation requirement for
those individuals covered solely by prong three of the disability definition
ultimately decided that it was “an acceptable compromise given our strong
expectation that such individuals would now be covered under the first prong of
the definition, properly applied.”225 In other words, the expectation is that
individuals with impairments that were not deemed to be substantially limiting
prior to the adoption of the ADAAA will now be covered by the expanded scope
of prong one and thereby be entitled to reasonable accommodations.
Perhaps that may be the case, but this outcome is not inevitable. While it is
true that Congress adopted a number of measures that will expand the scope of
prong-one coverage, it did not alter that prong’s basic formula. In order to have
standing under prong one, an individual still must establish that he or she has “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.”226 Rather than expressly lowering the bar posed by the “substantially
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limits” language, Congress decided to punt and let the EEOC define that term in
revised regulations.227
We have been down this road before. The original version of the ADA used
the same “substantially limits” language and the EEOC followed by issuing
relatively broad interpretive guidelines. But the courts ignored or disapproved of
many of the most significant guidelines and interpreted the term “substantially
limits” narrowly. It is possible that something similar could happen again. Courts
are generally prone to read legislative overrides narrowly and continue the viability
of judicial principles that appear at face value to have been rejected by the
legislature.228 More specifically, the judiciary has a natural incentive to guard its
dockets against a litigation deluge unleashed by revised legislation and broad
agency guidance.229 And as Professor Matthew Diller has cogently argued, “courts
do not fully grasp, let alone accept, the [ADA’s] reliance on a civil rights model
for addressing problems that people with disabilities face in the workplace.”230
Instead, many judges view ADA cases “as requests for special benefits made by
employees who are performing poorly.”231
That makes this second question a very important one in terms of determining
whether the “regarded as” compromise was a good or bad strategy. If the revamped
prong one does not absorb most of those individuals sharing Nancy’s
circumstances, the subset of people regarded as disabled but not adequately
protected under the ADA may be much larger than anticipated.
3. Will Courts Really Undertake a Two-Step Analysis of Disability Status under
the Amended Statute?
Following the ADAAA, a court may be required to undertake two different
analytical inquiries into disability status in a single ADA case. One type of
analysis is needed to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to assert an ADA
claim. A plaintiff can establish standing to assert a disability discrimination claim
under any prong of the ADA’s three-prong definition.232 A second type of analysis
may be necessary if a plaintiff requests a reasonable accommodation in order to
meet the qualifications for the job in question. Under the amended statute, an
employer is obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation only for a plaintiff
who establishes disability status under either prong one or prong two.233 Therefore,
it is possible that a court may undertake a prong three analysis with respect to the
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former issue and a prong one or prong two analysis with respect to the latter issue
in the same case.
While the ADAAA clearly contemplates both types of analysis, it is
conceivable that courts will be tempted to stop at a single “regarded as” inquiry for
at least two reasons. First, determining disability status under the new “regarded
as” prong is an easier task than determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity. All a court must decide under the “regarded as”
prong is whether an employer treats an employee adversely because of the
employee’s impairment.234 No “substantially limits” measuring stick is required.
Second, a number of courts have expressed reluctance to go beyond determining
the presence of discriminatory treatment in disability cases to consider whether an
employee is also entitled to an accommodation to assist performance ability.235
Such an inquiry is not required under other antidiscrimination statutes, and some
courts would prefer to read the ADA as not requiring any affirmative preferences
in the form of reasonable accommodations.236 Thus, stopping at the “regarded as”
inquiry may be both convenient and more palatable for some courts.
Developments under the 2008 amendments should be closely followed to
ensure that such a shortcut does not become common. Indeed, one would hope that
the anticipated EEOC regulations will expressly endorse a two-step analysis.
Perhaps the best way to accomplish this would be for the regulations to urge a
sequential approach in which the prong one (or prong two) analysis occurs first.
This would keep the issue of reasonable accommodation at the forefront while
retaining prong three as a safety valve against discrimination in situations where no
other statutory coverage is available.237
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4. What Is a “Transitory and Minor” Impairment Excluded from Coverage under
the “Regarded As” Prong?
A final component of the “regarded as” compromise is the ADAAA’s
exclusion of “transitory and minor” impairments.238 This exclusion was adopted as
a means to temper the otherwise considerable expansion of the “regarded as”
coverage accomplished by the elimination of any functional limitation
requirement.239 According to a House committee report, the inclusion of this
exception “responds to concerns raised by members of the employer community
regarding potential abuse of the Act and the misapplication of resources on
individuals with minor ailments that last only a short period of time.”240 The
unknown scope of this exclusion presents a fourth lingering question.
The ADAAA defines only one of the two operational terms used in this
exclusion: it defines a “transitory impairment” as “an impairment with an actual or
expected duration of 6 months or less.”241 The Act provides no inkling as to what
is meant by a minor impairment, but a House committee report explains that
without this exception the third “regarded as” prong of the disability definition
would extend to “common ailments like the cold or flu.”242
The “transitory and minor” exception gives rise to at least three interpretative
concerns. The first concern relates to the meaning of the term “minor.” Since the
ADAAA eliminates the “substantial limitation” requirement for “regarded as”
claims,243 the term must refer to an impairment that has some lesser type of impact.
But the dividing line between major and minor impairments is unclear. What is
clear is that the “minor” impairment exclusion will generate considerable
uncertainly and litigation.
Second, it is not clear from the act’s definition of transitory whether the actual
or the expected duration of an impairment should be more influential in a situation
where the actual and expected duration differ from each other. Take for example
the situation of an employee who has a minor impairment with an expected
duration of five months, is discriminated against by her employer on the basis of
her impairment during the third month, and ends up having the impairment for
eight months. Is this employee prohibited from bringing a claim in month eight
since the discrimination occurred during the time when she had a minor
impairment with an expected duration of less than six months? Or will she be
allowed to assert a “regarded as” claim since the impairment turned out to have an
actual duration of more than six months? Because the plain language excludes
impairments with either “an actual or expected duration of less than 6 months,”244
238
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the former interpretation likely is stronger. But this is a question that the courts
ultimately will have to decide.
Third, there is a danger that the “transitory and minor” exception will be read
in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive. As written, the exception applies
only to impairments that are both “transitory and minor,”245 such that a minor
impairment with a duration of more than six months apparently is covered by the
“regarded as” prong. It is not inconceivable, however, that courts hostile to
disability discrimination claims246 will read the exclusion to extend to claims
involving either transitory or minor impairments. Similar twists in interpretation
have occurred in other controversial contexts.247 Such a distorted construction, of
course, could significantly narrow the reach of the new “regarded as” prong.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress initially enacted the ADA in 1990 as a seemingly expansive civil
rights statute aimed at eradicating disability discrimination, but a judicial backlash,
highlighted by four Supreme Court cases, narrowly interpreted the ADA’s
disability standing requirement and undercut the statute’s effectiveness. Operating
in a “let’s try this again” mode, Congress enacted the ADAAA in 2008 as a
multifaceted attempt to override the restrictive court rulings. A crucial cornerstone
of the ADAAA is a compromise concerning the scope of the “regarded as” prong
of the disability definition. One aspect of the compromise is a dramatic expansion
in the coverage of individuals adversely treated on the basis of an actual or
perceived impairment. This expansion, however, is tempered by two
accompanying limitations that exclude coverage of “transitory and minor”
impairments and that eliminate any duty on the part of employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to individuals who qualify as disabled solely under the
“regarded as” prong.
The ADAAA clearly is welcome legislation that expands the class of
individuals protected against disability discrimination and deters workplace
decision-making predicated on stereotypical preconceptions. The “regarded as”
compromise, however, also comes with a series of lingering questions that have the
potential to hinder the ultimate goals of the new legislation. These areas of
uncertainty should be closely monitored in the years ahead to ensure that the courts
do not again frustrate the ADA’s reinvigorated promise.
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